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Over the past several years, federal legislators have proposed arbitration reforms 
through the Arbitration Fairness Act, which would limit the use of arbitration agreements 
to those arising after the beginning of a consumer or employment dispute. While the 
Arbitration Fairness Act would prevent the use of arbitration agreements in contracts of 
adhesion, and greatly limit the use of arbitration in consumer and employment contexts, 
the Act fails to rectify the power disparity between individuals, and repeat-player 
businesses once arbitration begins. As there is little chance of Congress passing preclusive 
arbitration reform under the Trump Administration,1 legislators should instead propose 
practical reform measures that mandate the use of consumer-friendly arbitration terms, and 
greater disclosure of arbitration results and arbitrator decisions. By doing so, legislators 
can garner bipartisan support for practical arbitration reform, rather than continue to 
promote the same tired, unsuccessful bill. 
II. A LEGISLATIVE IMPASSE 
Federal legislators have made several recent efforts to pass the Arbitration Fairness Act 
(“AFA”),2 which would amend the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) to preclude the use of 
pre-dispute arbitration agreements (“PDAAs”) in consumer and employment contracts.3 
Although introduced six times since 2007, the Act has failed to garner sufficient support to 
 
* Morgan Stanley is a Managing Editor of the Arbitration Law Review and a 2019 Juris Doctor Candidate at 
Penn State Law. 
1 George Friedman, A New Congressional Attempt to Curb Arbitration Agreements: A More Focused Attack 
that’s also Doomed to Fail, SECURITIES ARBITRATION COMMENTATOR (Feb. 14, 2016), 
http://www.sacarbitration.com/blog/new-congressional-attempt-curb-arbitration-agreements-focused-
attack-thats-also-doomed-fail/ (Noting that several attempts to amend the FAA to limit the use of mandatory 
arbitration have failed when Republicans have held Congress and the White House). 
 
2 See Arbitration Fairness Act of 2017, H.R. 1374, 115th Cong. (2017); Garen E. Dodge, Congress Considers 




3 See H.R. 1374; H.R. 2087, 114th Cong. (2015); H.R. 1844, 113th Cong. (2013); H.R. 1873, 112th Cong. 
(2011); H.R. 1020, 111th Cong. (2009); H.R. 3010, 110th Cong. (2007). (The arbitration fairness act was 





pass.4 Meanwhile, Supreme Court jurisprudence has strengthened the validity and 
enforceability of PDAAs,5 and many businesses include pre-dispute arbitration clauses in 
contracts to the extent of ubiquity.6 Given the Supreme Court’s favorable view of 
mandatory arbitration agreements, and the broad use of such clauses by businesses, 
arbitration reform will likely be achieved only by new legislation.7  
Under the Trump Administration, passage of the 2017 version of the AFA8 into law 
appears less likely than ever.9 In addition, after the rejection of the Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau’s (“CFPB”) arbitration rule in 2017,10 broad, preclusive reform 
measures are unlikely to win Congress’ approval.11 Now, however, publicity surrounding 
the AFA has brought PDAAs into the public eye, and support for arbitration reform has 
grown.12  
Unfortunately, the current draft of the AFA neither addresses the procedural 
shortcomings of consumer arbitration, nor attempts to manage the power disparity between 
repeat-player corporations and consumers, who have little choice but to agree to arbitration 
 
4 See Javier J. Castro, Employment Arbitration Reform: Preserving the Right to Class Proceedings in 
Workplace Disputes, 48 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 241, 265 (2014) (“This bill has drawn considerable support 
in the Senate, yet it has so far been unable to obtain the requisite number of votes to get past committee.”). 
5 Thomas E. Carbonneau, Arbitration Law in a Nutshell, 4th ed., 378 (“In AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 563 
U.S. 333, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011), the Court legitimated adhesive arbitration contracts. An obligation to 
arbitrate can be unilaterally imposed by the stronger party on its weaker counterpart . . . ”). 
6 See CFPB, Arbitration Study: Report to Congress, Pursuant to Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act, § 2, at 8 (2015) [hereinafter Arbitration Study] (listing that 99.9% of mobile 
wireless contracts, and 98.5% of storefront payday loan contracts include a mandatory arbitration clause). 
7 See Castro, supra note 4, at 264-65. 
8 Arbitration Fairness Act of 2017, H.R. 1374, 115th Cong. (2017). 
9 George Friedman, A New Congressional Attempt to Curb Arbitration Agreements: A More Focused Attack 
that’s also Doomed to Fail, SECURITIES ARBITRATION COMMENTATOR (Feb. 14, 2016), 
http://www.sacarbitration.com/blog/new-congressional-attempt-curb-arbitration-agreements-focused-
attack-thats-also-doomed-fail/. 
10 See 12 C.F.R. § 1040 (2017) (Limiting the use of pre-dispute arbitration agreements in consumer financial 
products and services, and precluding the use of class-action waivers). 
11 Evan Weinberger, Trump Officially Kills CFPB Arbitration Rule, LAW 360 (Nov. 1, 2017, 4:35 PM), 
https://www.law360.com/articles/980811/trump-officially-kills-cfpb-arbitration-rule. (“The U.S. Senate 
passed its version of the [Congressional Review Act] resolution of disapproval of the CFPB’s arbitration rule 
on a 51-50 vote with Vice President Mike Pence breaking a tie on Oct. 24. That followed a July vote in the 
U.S. House of Representatives to overturn the rule.”) 
12 Sylvan Lane, GOP Polling Firm: Bipartisan Support for Consumer Bureau Arbitration Rule, THE HILL 
(Oct. 5, 2017, 5:29 PM EDT), http://thehill.com/policy/finance/354143-gop-polling-firm-finds-bipartisan-
support-for-consumer-bureau-arbitration-rule; Stephen Rouzer, New Poll: Overwhelming Support for CFPB 
Arbitration Rule in Arizona and Maine, Fair Arbitration Now (Oct. 12, 2017), 
https://www.fairarbitrationnow.org/new-poll-overwhelming-support-cfpb-arbitration-rule-arizona-maine/ 





clauses in consumer contracts.13 Drafters of the AFA should instead propose practical 
reform measures to mitigate the inherent disparities between resource-rich companies and 
the ordinary consumer, which would establish a fairer arbitration process and garner more 
bipartisan support for the Act. Legislators concerned with arbitration reform should strike 
now, while the public is informed and academics continue to criticize the current state of 
consumer arbitration.14  
III. THE EVOLUTION OF CONSUMER ARBITRATION 
 
A. Arbitration: From Niche Practice to a Premier Alternative to Litigation 
Prior to federalization in 1925, 17th century common law governed arbitration.15 Courts 
viewed PDAAs as efforts to circumvent the courts’ jurisdiction,16 and parties were 
permitted to withdraw from arbitration at any point before the arbitrator issued an award.17  
In 1925, Congress passed the Federal Arbitration Act,18 which legitimized arbitration 
in maritime transactions and commerce,19 and explicitly provided that “an agreement in 
writing to submit to arbitration an existing controversy arising out of such a contract, 
transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds 
as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”20 The FAA also dictated 
procedures for arbitrator selection and granted arbitrators the authority to compel witness 
testimony.21 Furthermore, the FAA ensured that arbitration proceedings would remain 
 
13 Carbonneau, supra note 5, at 378. 
14 Taylor Lincoln & David Arkush, The Arbitration Debate Trap: How Opponents of Corporate 
Accountability Distort the Debate on Arbitration, PUBLIC CITIZEN (July 2008), 
https://www.citizen.org/sites/default/files/arbitrationdebatetrapfinal.pdf; Carbonneau, supra note 4, at 378. 
15 Steven A. Certilman, This Is a Brief History of Arbitration in the United States, 3 N.Y. DISP. RESOL. LAW 
10, 12 (2010); see also Arbitration Act, Pub. L. No. 68-401, 43 Stat. 883 (1925). 
16 Certilman supra note 15, at 12; see also Kill v. Hollister, 95 E.R. 532 (K.B. 1742) (stating that “the 
agreement of the parties [to arbitrate] cannot oust this court.”). 
17 Certilman supra note 15, at 12; see also Stephen Friedman, Arbitration Provisions: Little Darlings and 
Little Monsters, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2035, 2038 (2011) (“[C]ourts permitted either party to a pre-dispute 
arbitration agreement to revoke the agreement at any time before the entry of an award”); Vynior’s Case 77 
E.R. 597 (1609). (“So also it would seem that a revocation, made before a Judge's order is made a rule of 
Court, is also a revocation of the submission; and therefore the submission being gone, there remains nothing 
to make a rule of Court. . . .”) 
18 Arbitration Act., Pub. L. No. 68-401, 43 Stat. 883 (1925) (codified at 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2017)). 
19 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1947). 
20 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1947). 





subject to judicial review when necessary, and provided a mechanism to vacate arbitration 
awards that resulted from corruption, fraud, or arbitrator misconduct. 22 
In the following years, the Supreme Court expanded and strengthened arbitration’s 
position in the United States.23 In 1967, the Court’s decision in Prima Paint Corp v. Flood 
& Conklin Mfg. Co (“Prima Paint”) established the separability doctrine, which directed 
that arbitration agreements are enforceable unless challenged on grounds of contract 
validity.24 The same year, the Court overturned a California law that exempted franchise 
cases from arbitration, holding that by enacting a substantive rule applicable in both state 
and federal courts, “Congress intended to foreclose state legislative attempts to undercut 
the enforceability of arbitration agreements.”25 Three years later, the Court recognized that 
Section 2 of the FAA, which presumes that arbitration clauses are valid and enforceable,26 
represents a “federal policy favoring arbitration agreements,”27 and ruled that, “as a matter 
of federal law, any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in 
favor of arbitration . . . .”28 Finally, the Supreme Court ruled that the courts must grant 
motions to compel arbitration, regardless of potential judicial inefficiency over related 
 
22 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2002) (In any of the following cases the United States court in and for the district wherein 
the award was made may make an order vacating the award upon the application of any party to the arbitration 
(1) where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means; (2) where there was evident partiality 
or corruption in the arbitrators, or either of them; (3) where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in 
refusing to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and 
material to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been 
prejudiced; or (4) where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, 
final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made.). 
23 See e.g Prima Paint Corp v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 
465 U.S. 1 (1980). 
 
24 Prima Paint Corp, 388 U.S. at 403 (“[T]he federal court is instructed to order arbitration to proceed once it 
is satisfied that "the making of the agreement for arbitration or the failure to comply [with the arbitration 
agreement] is not in issue.”). 
25 Southland Corp., 465 U.S. at 16. 
26 See 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1947) (“. . . an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing controversy 
arising out of such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon 
such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”). 
27 Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Construction Co., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983). 





claims.29 The Supreme Court thus firmly established that the FAA governs disputes 
concerning arbitration.30 
B. The Rise of Consumer Arbitration and Pre-dispute Arbitration Agreements 
Recognizing the merits of arbitration over litigation,31 businesses began to include pre-
dispute arbitration clauses in their contracts.32 Consumers and employees, however, could 
invalidate arbitration clauses under common law theories of contract validity, such as 
unconscionability, so long as the challenging parties’ claims concerned the arbitration 
clause itself.33 Courts often found PDAAs to be unconscionable, for example, when the 
agreement conferred an unfair advantage to the party compelling arbitration.34 Provisions 
that conferred an unfair advantage included provisions that granted only one party power 
 
29 Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 221 (1985) (holding that “[t]he preeminent concern of 
Congress in passing the Act was to enforce private agreements into which parties had entered, and that 
concern requires that we rigorously enforce agreements to arbitrate, even if the result is ‘piecemeal’ litigation, 
at least absent a countervailing policy manifested in another federal statute.”). 
30 Carbonneau, supra note 5, at 2; Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp., 465 U.S. at 24-25 (“The Arbitration Act 
establishes that, as a matter of federal law, any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be 
resolved in favor of arbitration, whether the problem at hand is the construction of the contract language itself 
or an allegation of waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability”). 
31 See Edward Wood Dunham, The Arbitration Clause as Class Action Shield, FRANCHISE L.J. 141-142 
(Spring 1997) (“Absent unusual circumstances . . . [a] franchisor with an arbitration clause should be able to 
require each franchisee in the potential class to pursue individual claims in a separate arbitration. Since many 
(and perhaps most) of the putative class members may never do that, and because arbitrators typically do not 
issue runaway awards, strict enforcement of an arbitration clause should enable the franchisor to reduce 
dramatically its aggregate exposure”). 
32 See, e.g., Badie v. Bank of America, 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d. 273, 276 (1998) (ruling that an arbitration clause is 
unenforceable when the respondent bank unilaterally included the clause after the parties had entered a 
contract.);) DAI v. Hollingsworth, 949 F. Supp. 77 (D. Conn. 1996) (upholding DAI’s arbitration agreements, 
precluding a state class action suit). 
33 See Prima Paint Corp v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 403-04 (1967) (stating that “if the claim 
is fraud in the inducement of the arbitration clause itself -- an issue which goes to the ‘making’ of the 
agreement to arbitrate -- the federal court may proceed to adjudicate it.”); Carbonneau, supra note 5, at 110 
(“[FAA §2] expressly provided that agreements to arbitrate could be challenged only on the basis of standard 
contract formation grounds (e.g., indefinite subject matter, lack of capacity in a contracting party, the failure 
to coordinate offer and acceptance, the absence of consideration, or unconscionability)”).  
34 Nino v. Jewelry Exchange, Inc., 609 F.3d 191, 204 (3d Cir. 2010) (stating that “arbitration provisions that 
confer an ‘unfair advantage’ upon the party with greater bargaining power are substantively 





to select an arbitrator,35 restrict discovery,36 or limit an arbitrator’s authority when 
determining an award.37 Courts examining such provisions often found that consumers 
were stripped of their legal rights, including access to a remedy.38  
Corporations responded to contemporary jurisprudence by including delegation clauses 
in consumer agreements, which grant arbitrators authority to determine the validity of the 
arbitration clause itself,39 a concept also known as kompetenz-kompetenz.40 The Supreme 
Court upheld the validity of delegation clauses in 2010,41 thus further expanding the 
separability doctrine established in Prima Paint, which had already limited challenges of 
arbitration to those premised upon issues concerning contract validity.42 The Court 
reasoned that a delegation clause is a separate agreement to arbitrate the validity of the 
arbitration clause by itself.43 By establishing that delegation clauses are severable, the 
Court provided a fast-track to arbitration for consumer disputes, which forces claimants to 
first submit to arbitration to determine whether the delegation clause is conscionable before 






35 Hooters of Am. v. Phillips, 39 F. Supp. 2d 582, 614 (S.C. 1998) (finding a provision limiting arbitration 
selection to a list of company approved arbitrators unconscionable). 
36 Id. at 614; Ferguson v. Countrywide Credit Indus., 298 F.3d 778 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that an arbitration 
provision limiting depositions of corporate representatives to four topics provided the employer an unfair 
advantage). 
37 Stirlen v. Supercuts, Inc., 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 138, 154 (1997) (finding an arbitration agreement’s damages 
restrictions unconscionable). 
 
38 Ting v. AT&T, 182 F. Supp. 2d 902, 939 (N.D. Cal. 2002).  
39 See Rent-A-Center, W., Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 68-69 (2010) (Upholding the validity of Rent-A-
Center’s delegation provision, noting that “parties can agree to arbitrate ‘gateway’ questions of ‘arbitrability,’ 
such as whether the parties have agreed to arbitrate . . .”).  
40 Carbonneau, supra note 5, at 29 (“Kompetenz-kompetenz, or jurisdiction to rule on jurisdictional 
challenges, establishes that the arbitral tribunal can rule on matters relating to the validity and scope of the 
agreement to arbitrate.”). 
 
41 Id.  
42 Prima Paint Corp., 388 U.S. at 403-04.  
43 See Rent-A-Center, W., Inc., 561 U.S. at 71 (“a party's challenge to another provision of the contract, or 
to the contract as a whole, does not prevent a court from enforcing a specific agreement to arbitrate.”). 





C. Concepcion, Italian Colors and the Consumer Arbitration Debate 
In recent decisions, the Supreme Court has made PDAAs nearly impervious to 
consumer and employer challenges of contract validity.45 In AT&T Mobility LLC v. 
Concepcion (“Concepcion”),46 the Supreme Court held that class action waivers in 
consumer contracts of adhesion are enforceable, even when applied to small claims.47 The 
Court overruled California’s decision to prohibit class action waivers in arbitration 
agreements,48 reasoning that class-wide arbitration proceedings preclude individual claims, 
judicialize arbitration proceedings,49 and increase defendants’ risk of being held liable, 
especially due to the lack of multilayered review in arbitral proceedings.50 Concluding that 
arbitration was ill-suited for class-wide proceedings,51 the Court upheld AT&T’s class 
action waiver.52  
The Court further established the enforceability of PDAAs in American Express v. 
Italian Colors (“Italian Colors”), in which claimants sought class action arbitration 
proceedings to avoid the costs of individual proceedings, which would exceed each 
claimant’s total amount in controversy.53 Respondents argued that the class action waiver 
was unenforceable because the claims were based on federal antitrust statutes, and the class 
waiver precluded the claimant’s right to seek a remedy.54 The Court rejected American 
Express’ argument, stating that, although the class action waiver may render claims too 
expensive to pursue, the waiver did not actually preclude each claimant from seeking 
relief.55 The Court clarified that class arbitration remained unavailable for consumers 
seeking a remedy.56  
 
45 Carbonneau, supra note 5, at 230. 
46 AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, (2011). 
47 Id. at 352. 
48 Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 1108-09 (Cal. 2005) (holding that a class action waiver 
provision was unconscionable when applied to consumer claims alleging that a credit card company had 
wrongfully charged customers a $29 late fee). 
49 Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 347-48. 
50 Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 350. 
51 Id. (noting that “[a]rbitration is poorly suited to the higher stakes of class litigation”). 
52 Id. at 352. 
53 Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2308 (2013). 
54 Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. at 2310. 
55 Id. at 2311. (“that ‘[the class-action waiver] no more eliminates [the] parties’ right to pursue their statutory 
remedy than did federal law before its adoption of the class action for legal relief in 1938 . . . ”).  
56 Id. at 2312. (concluding that class procedures “ . . . would undoubtedly destroy the prospect of speedy 





The impact of Concepcion and Italian Colors is still debated. Conservative and pro-
business groups argue that the decisions are pro-consumer,57 and commend the value of 
arbitration as an accessible venue for consumers seeking redress.58 Conservatives contend 
that the speed and informality of arbitration benefits consumers59 and that consumers may 
simply refuse to enter contracts mandating arbitration.60 These decisions have also been 
criticized by progressive and pro-consumer groups who reject the consumer-friendly 
characterization of arbitration.61 Progressives argue that mandatory arbitration clauses 
relieve corporations of accountability for abusive practices,62 and that consumers are less 
successful in arbitration than in judicial proceedings.63  
Regardless of the benefit that arbitration confers to consumers, the Supreme Court’s 
jurisprudence has insulated PDAAs from common law theories of contract 
unenforceability, and courts almost always enforce arbitration agreements under Section 2 
 
57 Ted Frank, Class Actions, Arbitration, and Consumer Rights: Why Concepcion is a Pro-Consumer 
Decision, MANHATTAN INST., Legal Policy Report No.16 (Feb. 19, 2013), https://www.manhattan-
institute.org/html/class-actions-arbitration-and-consumer-rights-why-concepcion-pro-consumer-decision-
5896.html. 
58 See, e.g., Brief of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America and Business Roundtable as 
Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 30, Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013) 
(“bilateral arbitration overwhelmingly increases access to justice for millions of individuals throughout the 
Nation.”). 
59 Hans von Spakovsky, The Unfair Attack on Arbitration: Harming Consumers by Eliminating a Proven 
Dispute Resolution System, THE HERITAGE FOUND. (July 17, 2013), http://www.heritage.org/report/the-
unfair-attack-arbitration-harming-consumers-eliminating-proven-dispute-resolution-system. 
60 Id.  
61 See Brief of Amicus Curiae Public Citizen, Inc., Supporting Respondents at 18, Am. Express Co. v. Italian 
Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013) (“the arbitration process poses significant barriers to the assertion of 
consumer claims . . . ”). 
62 Joe Valenti, The Case Against Mandatory Consumer Arbitration Clauses, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Aug. 
2, 2016, 9:01 AM), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/economy/reports/2016/08/02/142095/the-
case-against-mandatory-consumer-arbitration-clauses/. 
63 Katherine V.W. Stone & Alexander J.S. Colvin, The Arbitration Epidemic, ECONOMIC POLICY INSTITUTE 





of the FAA.64 Arbitration reform must therefore be realized through other non-judicial 
avenues. The AFA remains a potential vehicle to empower consumers subject to PDAAs.65 
III.  THE ARBITRATION FAIRNESS ACT 
A detailed assessment of the Arbitration Fairness Act reveals that the Act intends to 
make arbitration more equitable by broadly precluding its use, rather than by addressing 
the procedural issues inherent to the practice. The AFA addresses fairness concerns over 
the mandatory use of arbitration provisions, including when consumers lack sufficient 
knowledge and resources to successfully challenge corporations in arbitration,66 and when 
the consumer has little choice but to agree to a PDAA.67 To reach this goal, the AFA 
attempts to reform resolution of consumer and labor disputes by eliminating use of 
mandatory PDAAs. 68   
The AFA would alter clauses in Section 2 of the FAA that establish the validity of 
particular classes of arbitration agreements.69 The crux of the bill provides that, 
“[n]otwithstanding any other provision of this title, no [PDAA] shall be valid or 
enforceable if it requires arbitration of an employment dispute, consumer dispute, or civil 
rights dispute.”70 The AFA, therefore, would preclude all forms of PDAA, ultimately 
relegating consumer arbitration to voluntary, post-dispute arbitration proceedings.  
The AFA would also establish that, under Section 2 of the FAA, the validity and 
enforceability of an arbitration agreement “shall be determined by a court, rather than an 
arbitrator, irrespective of whether the party resisting arbitration challenges the arbitration 
agreement specifically or in conjunction with other terms of the contract containing such 
 
64 See Carolyn Shapiro, Arbitration Uber Alles in the Supreme Court, CHICAGO-KENT COLL. OF L. FAC. 
BLOG, (June 21, 2013), http://blogs.kentlaw.iit.edu/faculty/2013/06/21/arbitration-uber-alles-in-the-
supreme-court/. (“American Express gives monopolists a road map to insulate themselves from liability 
under the antitrust laws. And it makes clear to all kinds of powerful interests that they can construct arbitration 
agreements so restrictive that no one in their right mind would take advantage of them, even if, as in American 
Express, this effectively nullifies a whole host of other important federal rights”). 
65 Arbitration Fairness Act of 2017, H.R. 1374, 115th Cong. § 2 (2017). 
66 Arbitration: Is it Fair When Forced?: Hearing Before the Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 2(2011) 
(Statement of Sen. Al Franken) (“These bills, like the ones that have come before it, seek to limit the use of 
forced arbitration clauses in contexts where one party suffers from a substantially weaker bargaining position. 
These particular bills focus on consumers and workers who sign form contracts with corporations.”). 
67 Arbitration Fairness Act of 2017, H.R. 1374, 115th Cong. § 2 (2017). 
68 Id. at § 3. 
 
69 Id. at § 3(a). 





agreement.”71 In other words, the AFA would remove arbitrator authority to rule on its own 
jurisdiction and relegate determinations of validity and enforceability to the court system.72 
The broad provisions of the AFA are predicated on a number of findings stated within 
the bill, which rightfully paint the current overall state of consumer arbitration as an unjust, 
secretive process forced upon consumers.73 The bill first asserts that when the Supreme 
Court extended the FAA to consumer disputes the Court infringed on Congress’ purpose 
behind the FAA, stating that the FAA “was intended to apply to disputes between 
commercial entities of generally similar sophistication and bargaining power.”74 
Furthermore, consumers have “little or no meaningful choice whether to submit their 
claims to arbitration,” and “[m]andatory arbitration undermines the development of public 
law because there is inadequate transparency and inadequate judicial review of arbitrators' 
decisions.”75 The findings do, however, make clear that the bill does not intend to eliminate 
consumer arbitration as a whole, stating that arbitration is acceptable “when consent to the 
arbitration is truly voluntary and occurs after the dispute arises.”76  
In light of the congressional concerns over the inherent unfairness of the consumer 
arbitration procedure and the lack of consumer choice but to submit to arbitration, the AFA 
seeks to eliminate binding PDAAs to equalize the bargaining power between individual 
consumer claimants and corporate defendants.77 The AFA’s prohibition against PDAAs in 
consumer and labor contracts is particularly broad and would subject all such arbitration 
procedures to the same standards that govern post-dispute arbitration agreements.78 Such 
an approach, however, fails to fully address the asserted fairness issues of consumer 
arbitration. Consumer arbitration reform through practical legislative measures would 
greatly assist consumers and would be far more likely to garner the bipartisan support 
necessary to pass an arbitration reform measure of any kind.  
 
 
71 Arbitration Fairness Act of 2017, at § 3(a). 
72 Id. 
73 Id. at § 2 (2017) (Finding that mandatory arbitration undermines the development of public law due to the 
lack of procedural transparency and judicial review, and that most consumers and employees have little to 
no choice in submitting their claims to arbitration, and often lack awareness that they have agreed to arbitrate 
future claims). 
 
74 Id.  
75 Id. 
76 Arbitration Fairness Act of 2017, at § 2. 
77 Id. at §§ 2(1), (3). 
78 Id. at § 2(5) (“Arbitration can be an acceptable alternative when consent to the arbitration is truly voluntary, 





IV. SHORTCOMINGS OF THE CURRENT ARBITRATION FAIRNESS ACT 
Although the Arbitration Fairness Act’s moratorium on PDAAs may afford consumers 
broader latitude when choosing a dispute resolution method, the Act fails to address 
procedural fairness concerns in consumer arbitration. Furthermore, the AFA’s attempt to 
empower consumers has missed the mark, because the Act’s PDAA would largely 
foreclose arbitration, in which consumers tend to succeed more often than in litigation.79 
A. The Arbitration Fairness Act Would Limit the Consumer’s Choice of 
Dispute Resolution, Disadvantaging Consumer Claimants 
While the AFA’s legislative scheme seeks to prohibit PDAA clauses, the Act would 
allow consumers to agree to arbitration after a dispute has arisen. However, post-dispute 
agreements to arbitrate will likely transpire less often than PDAAs because of the 
consumers’ lack of knowledge regarding arbitration proceedings and the lack of readily 
available information on prior awards.80 Additionally, academics recognize that parties 
have conflicting priorities after disputes arise, which makes an agreement to post-dispute 
arbitration less likely.81 Corporations are not likely to agree to low-cost arbitration 
proceedings, which appeal to consumers.82 Conversely, consumer counsels are not likely 
to advise arbitration when the alleged damages are high because a corporation faced with 
an uncertain jury trial is more likely to seek settlement.83  
Because voluntary post-dispute arbitration is often unfavorable to at least one party, the 
current AFA’s prohibition against PDAAs will functionally preclude consumer arbitration 
in most disputes. Consumers will be more likely to litigate claims and forego the benefits 
that arbitration can provide. A CFPB study found that claims submitted to arbitration are 
generally resolved faster than either individual or class action claims submitted to 
litigation, especially claims submitted in state or multi-district courts.84 The CFPB study 
also showed that consumers are more likely to receive favorable judgments in arbitral 
 
79 Arbitration Study, supra note 6, § 5 at 13; §6 at 48. 
 
80 Arbitration Study, supra note 6, § 3 at 3-4; Carbonneau, supra note 5, at 23-24.  
81 Samuel Estreicher, Saturns for Rickshaws: The Stakes in the Debate over Predispute Employment 
Arbitration Agreements, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 559, 567 (2001). 
82 Id.  
 
83 Id. 
84 See Arbitration Study, supra note 6, § 5, at 12 (arbitrator decisions were generally issued “within five to 
eight months after the case was filed” and “the median time to settlement was 155 days of initiation.”); id., § 
6, at 9 (“federal class cases closed in a median of approximately 218 days for cases filed in 2010, and 211 
days for cases filed in 2011. Class cases in multi-district litigation . . . [closed] in a median of approximately 
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proceedings rather than in class or individual litigation.85 Consumers additionally benefit 
from the majority of arbitration agreements, which require that in-person hearings occur in 
a location reasonably convenient to the consumer, a valuable alternative to choice-of-law 
provisions, which may lead to adjudication in distant jurisdictions.86 Moreover, arbitrators 
often award attorney’s fees to prevailing consumers, and many arbitration agreements 
provide that companies will pay or advance initial arbitration fees.87 Ultimately, the AFA’s 
moratorium on PDAAs will likely disadvantage consumers seeking relief and may deny 
indigent consumers their day in court.  
B. The Arbitration Fairness Act Does Not Rectify Procedural Fairness Issues 
in Consumer Arbitration 
The AFA’s broad prohibition against PDAAs fails to address a number of consumer 
arbitration fairness concerns, including the threats of repeat-player and repeat-arbitrator 
biases in arbitral proceedings.88 Rather, the reduced number of arbitrations may exacerbate 
the risk of repeat player bias as competition amongst arbitrators increases. The repeat-
player bias theory asserts that arbitrators are more likely to rule in favor of a party that 
frequently engages in arbitration, hoping to be hired again.89 This theory similarly 
recognizes that arbitral bodies compete for business and asserts that these organizations are 
incentivized to adopt business-friendly procedures to govern consumer arbitration.90 
Arbitrators are also compelled to make pro-business decisions to avoid blacklisting 
 
85 Arbitration Study, supra note 6, § 5, at 13 (“Of . . . 158 cases, arbitrators provided some kind of relief in 
favor of consumers’ affirmative claims in 32 disputes (20.3%).”); id. at 293 (“Relative to class cases where 
a consumer judgment (class-wide or non-class) occurred in 1.8% of all cases, judgment for consumer(s) 
occurred more frequently in individual cases, in 6.8% of cases.”). 
86 Id,. § 5, at 71 (“we were able to generate a distance estimate in 86 of the 116 disputes filed in 2010 and 
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87 Arbitration: Is it Fair When Forced?: Hearing Before the Committee on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 101 
(2011) (statement of Christopher R. Drahozal, John M. Rounds Professor of Law, Associate Dean for 
Research & Faculty Development, University of Kansas School of Law), Attachment 1, (“Consumer 
claimants sought to recover attorneys’ fees in over 50% of the cases in which they were awarded damages 
and were awarded attorneys’ fees in 63.1% of those cases.”); Arbitration Study, supra note 6, at 81-83.  
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themselves from future employment.91 By contrast, arbitral bodies have little incentive to 
seek repeat business from consumer claimants who do not often engage in arbitration.92  
As the preclusion of PDAAs would decrease the total number of arbitration proceedings, 
arbitrators will face greater pressure to be selected in the future, incentivizing them to rule 
in favor of businesses more often than before.  
Repeat-player bias also threatens consumers when considered alongside the scope of 
judicial review that courts apply to arbitral decisions, as consumers may struggle to 
demonstrate that an arbitrator’s decision was the result of misconduct. Under FAA Section 
10, courts may only vacate arbitral awards where a party demonstrates that the award was 
procured by “undue means,” such as arbitrator impartiality, corruption, or procedural 
misconduct.93 Courts, therefore, may only review arbitral decisions where an arbitrator has 
engaged in misconduct, and courts grant broad deference to an arbitrator’s decision on the 
merits of the claim.94 While arbitrator partiality is sufficient to vacate an award, the test to 
prove “evident partiality” varies between federal circuits, and several circuits require 
evidence from the arbitration itself to substantiate such claims.95 Because transcripts are 
not mandatory in arbitration,96 consumers may have difficulty proving claims by evident 
partiality in federal circuits that require evidence to challenge an arbitral award if they lack 
a transcript to substantiate their challenge to the arbitrator’s impartiality. Without a 
transcript or other evidence to demonstrate arbitrator misconduct or partiality, an 
arbitrator’s decision will be upheld. 
 
91 Lincoln & Arkush, supra note 88 at 24-25 (“This previous view of Rutledge’s finds support in anecdotal 
evidence, such as the notorious case of Harvard law professor Elizabeth Bartholet, who evidently was 
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92 Stephan Landsman, ADR and the Cost of Compulsion, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1593, 1615 (2005) (“[T]here is a 
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competitive advantage and increase business. These pressures have led some ADR organizations to seek 
cooperative agreements with adhesion contract drafters in the hope of securing a steady flow of business.”). 
 
93 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(1)-(3) (2002). 
94 Carbonneau, supra note 5, at 122 (“A nearly irrefutable presumption exists in federal law that arbitral 
awards, once rendered, are legally enforceable.”). 
95 Laura M. Fontaine, Establishing an Arbitrator's "Evident Partiality", A.B.A. SEC. OF LITIG., TRIAL 
EVIDENCE COMM. (2011), http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/committees/trialevidence/ articles/fall2011-
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evidence from the arbitration itself to show actual bias for or against a party to the arbitration . . . In addition, 
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96 See, e.g., Consumer Arbitration Rules, AM. ARB. ASS’N, 22 (2016) (“R-27. Written Record of Hearing: (a) 
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The AFA’s broad preclusion of PDAAs additionally fails to address discovery issues 
in arbitration proceedings. Unlike the expansive discovery allowed in litigation, arbitration 
sacrifices scope of discovery for speed of proceedings.97 PDAAs may limit the scope or 
duration discovery, or forego discovery altogether, so long as the arbitrator has ultimate 
discretion in dictating discovery procedures.98 Although limited discovery ensures that 
disputes resolve themselves quickly, consumer claimants are likely to be disadvantaged by 
abridged discovery procedures, as consumers often lack the resources to access documents 
or depose corporate representatives to substantiate their claims.99 The limited scope of 
discovery, although expeditious, may seriously impair meritorious consumer claims.  
Finally, the AFA fails to address policy concerns that consumer arbitration lacks 
transparency and interferes with the development of public law.100 The proposed Act does 
not require transparency of arbitral decisions, which would restrict consumer attempts to 
research the resolution of prior arbitration proceedings.101 Consumers may choose to 
litigate their claims, even though arbitration may be more advantageous, because the 
consumer is unequipped to evaluate the potential success of their claim. 
C. The Arbitration Fairness Act Does Nothing to Earn Support from Business 
Interests to Garner Bipartisan Support 
In its current form, the legislative scheme of the AFA gives business interest little 
incentive to work with consumer interests towards pragmatic arbitration reform, instead 
tempering business interests against the premise of reform overall. The AFA’s current 
scheme to broadly preempt the use of PDAAs threatens business interest’s widespread 
reliance on such provisions, which serves as a rallying-cry for business interests to oppose 
the act.102 Specifically, a moratorium on PDAAs would harm business interests by 
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diverting disputes from arbitration to litigation, increasing the length and costs of 
proceedings while negating the benefits that repeat-player businesses gain in arbitration.103 
Moreover, businesses would be exposed to significantly greater risks of liability through 
class-action proceedings than they would experience in individual consumer arbitration.104 
Business interests are inclined to oppose the AFA because the act’s broad preclusion on 
the use of PDAA’s would increase the costs of settling or resolving consumer claims, while 
simultaneously providing little benefit to businesses.105 As discussed above, arbitral 
proceedings are desirable to both consumer and corporate parties because they are less 
complex, and more informal than traditional court proceedings.106 While simplicity and 
informality may disadvantage a consumer seeking to vindicate their rights, these features 
conversely benefit businesses who often find themselves defending against such consumer 
claims. Businesses benefit from abridged discovery proceedings, given that they have 
greater resources than consumers in discovery stages and often have little need to engage 
in discovery to the extent of consumer claimants.107 Moreover, any risk of arbitrator bias, 
pursuant to the repeat-player theory, would favor a business compelling arbitration through 
PDAA’s, as repeat-player bias inherently favors drafters of adhesion contracts over first-
time consumer claimants.108 Repeat-player status, in conjunction with the lack of 
transparency in arbitral proceedings, allows businesses to leverage their experience in 
arbitration.109 While a repeat-player business can maintain records of past decisions and 
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settlements, consumers lack similar information, ultimately granting businesses an 
advantage in deciding when to settle, and when to proceed to arbitration. 
Similarly, businesses prefer arbitration over litigation because of the limitations on 
liability inherent to arbitral proceedings. Most notably, pursuant to Italian Colors, business 
interests benefit from the enforceability of pre-dispute class-waivers.110 Under Italian 
Colors, businesses can include class-action waivers in PDAA’s, limiting consumer claims 
to those made on an individual basis and mitigate the expanded monetary risk of being held 
liable under class-action suits.111 Business interests have a clear motive to oppose the AFA 
following Italian Colors, as prohibition on the use of PDAA’s would undercut efforts to 
compel customers to sign class waivers, ultimately eliminating the protection from class 
action that PDAA’s can provide. More broadly, the AFA would also increase businesses 
exposure to liability by directing more consumer disputes to litigation, which imposes the 
uncertainty of a jury trial.112 Where businesses can be more certain of results in arbitration, 
jury verdicts may be less predictable, may impose greater liabilities, and may compel 
businesses to settle more often than they would in arbitration.113 
V. PRACTICAL REGULATION MAY EVEN THE POWER DISPARITY BETWEEN BUSINESSES 
AND CONSUMERS, AND ACHIEVE GREATER SUPPORT IN CONGRESS  
The Arbitration Fairness Act’s ban against PDAAs will not benefit consumers in 
arbitration, and will leave some consumers without a venue to seek remedy likely due to 
high litigation costs.114 Because the ban would harm both business and consumer interests, 
the AFA, which was first introduced in 2007, has garnered little support in Congress.115 
Arbitration reform, however, is not doomed. More sensible provisions may ensure greater 
Congressional support and businesses may capitulate to practical reform to ensure that 
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PDAAs remain enforceable.116 In addition, consumer-friendly arbitration terms can 
remedy many of the fairness issues by placing the consumer on equal footing with 
businesses. 
A. Legislatively-Mandated Consumer-Friendly Arbitration Terms Can Place 
Consumers on Equal Footing with Businesses in Arbitral Proceedings 
The PDAA at issue in Concepcion serves as a model provision for consumer-friendly 
arbitration agreements, which federal legislators should use in part to draft practical 
legislation mandating the use of consumer-friendly arbitration terms.  In Concepcion, the 
Court evaluated the viability of consumer-friendly arbitration provisions.117 The PDAA 
contained a number of provisions meant to benefit consumer claimants. First, AT&T 
offered to pay all costs for non-frivolous claims, and stipulated that “in the event that a 
customer receives an arbitration award greater than AT&T's last written settlement offer, 
requires AT&T to pay a $7,500 minimum recovery and twice the amount of the claimant's 
attorney's fees.”118 The agreement offered beneficial venue provisions as well, dictating 
that the arbitration would take place in the county where the customer was billed, and 
permitting the customer to choose to conduct the arbitration over the phone or through 
document submissions where claims allege damages under $10,000.119 Furthermore, the 
agreement did not limit damages, it barred AT&T from seeking reimbursement for 
attorneys’ fees, and included a small claims carve-out allowing either party to remove the 
dispute to small claims court.120  
Enacting legislation that requires consumer-friendly arbitration provisions may 
mitigate concerns regarding consumer choice and the disparity of resources between 
corporations and consumers.121 Statutory provisions that require small-claims opt-out 
provisions in consumer contracts would allow potential consumer claimants to choose 
between litigation and arbitration, and a statute that requires flexibility in appearance may 
offer more consumers the opportunity to seek relief when an in-person appearance may be 
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prohibitive.122 Additionally, legislation that requires pro-consumer cost-splitting 
provisions may mitigate the resource disparity between consumers and businesses, thus 
allowing more consumers to seek remedies in arbitration.123 Finally, legislation prohibiting 
limits on an arbitrator’s discretion to provide individual relief would greatly mollify 
concerns that arbitration is a means for corporations to insulate themselves from 
accountability, because the arbitrators would have complete discretion when issuing 
damages.124  
Although such legislation might threaten the overall freedom of contract afforded to 
corporations when drafting arbitration agreements, requiring consumer-friendly terms may 
never-the-less find support as a reform measure. AT&T’s provisions in the Concepcion 
agreement125 suggest that companies do not completely oppose legislation mandating 
consumer-friendly terms. Furthermore, the CFPB study indicates that consumer arbitration 
provisions widely incorporate consumer-friendly terms similar  to those used in the 
Concepcion agreement.126  For instance, the CFPB found that 93% of arbitration clauses 
contain small claims “carve outs,”127 a multiplicity of agreements that require the company 
forcing arbitration to pay or advance at least a portion of fees.128  In addition, a majority of 
arbitration agreements bar shifting company fees to the consumer, and shifting consumer 
fees to the company.129 Moreover, reform measures that require consumer-friendly terms  
do not infringe on the parties’ freedom of contract to a great extent, because PDAAs would 
represent a quid pro quo contract between the parties, in which the consumer may waive 
their ability to litigate future disputes in exchange for favorable terms of arbitration.  
B. Legislatively-Mandated Disclosure Can Minimize Arbitrator Bias and 
Mitigate Concerns over Discovery Procedure and Judicial Review 
Statutory disclosure and transparency requirements would make the arbitration process 
fairer for consumers as increased availability of information regarding arbitrators and their 
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decisions may help consumers select an impartial arbitrator. The CFPB found that a vast 
majority of arbitration agreements do not contain confidentiality and/or non-disclosure 
provisions regarding the results of the proceedings.130 These results show that parties who 
impose arbitration may not oppose disclosing arbitral decisions. Proceedings can become 
more transparent by following California’s approach, which requires that arbitration 
companies publish quarterly reports on their website. 131 These reports must disclose if the 
arbitration arose from a PDAA, the non-consumer party’s name, how often they are a party 
in arbitration, the subject matter of the dispute, which party prevailed, the relevant dates of 
the proceeding, the disposition, the claim amount and any awards, and the name of the 
arbitrator.132 Further, California statute establishes that that a failure to disclose relevant 
information or conflicts pertinent to arbitration is grounds to vacate an award, even when 
no arbitrator misconduct affected the outcome.133  Mandated disclosure of proceeding 
details and   arbitrator conflicts might expose pro-business biases, which would allow 
consumers to weed-out potential arbitrators with a history of decisions favoring repeat-
players. As such, a statutory requirement to publish arbitration reports on provider’s 
websites can substantially improve consumer claimant’s access to arbitration data, 
ultimately improving knowledge of the practice, and their chances before a tribunal. 
A more passive approach to resolving transparency issues is to legislatively preclude 
pre-dispute confidentiality provisions altogether, and by permitting the potential claimants 
to collect and disseminate information on arbitrators and proceedings. Professor Lisa 
Blomgren Amsler has recognized a multitude of websites designed to crowdsource 
information on employers, and individuals need only create their own arbitration review 
website.134 With an outlet to compile data on arbitrations, consumers can mitigate the 
repeat-player effect through the crowdsourcing of information about arbitrators and 
arbitration service providers, as arbitrators will then be encouraged to consider their 
reputation on the consumer-side as well.135 Additionally, this method would not altogether 
disregard a business’ interest in nondisclosure. Parties would retain the option to sign a 
non-disclosure agreement after a dispute arises, and businesses would have an incentive to 
propose a fair settlement to consumers where businesses desire non-disclosure.136 While 
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possible, the creation of an arbitration-data crowdsourcing website would require 
individuals to take initiative and build such a website, and upload data of their own volition. 
As such, there is no way to foresee how effective such a website may turn out to be, or if 
it would improve the general transparency of arbitral proceedings at all, but it is a start.  
Between the methods noted above, legislatively- mandated disclosure of arbitration 
reports on their respective websites, akin to California’s requirements,137 would be more 
likely to benefit consumers than simply precluding the use of pre-dispute nondisclosure 
agreements (“NDAs”). Requiring disclosure by arbitration providers places the onus of 
disclosure on the a more sophisticated party than the average consumer claimant. 
Arbitration providers have better access to their own records, and publication on a 
provider’s website means that arbitration data is both centralized and complete. 
Conversely, a consumer-input option may result in incomplete data sets, given that a 
consumer-driven approach would require individuals to take the initiative to self-report 
arbitration results in a comprehensive manner. Further, a revised AFA should establish 
grounds for award vacatur where arbitrators fail to disclose conflicts of interest, which 
would naturally compel disclosure.138 Vacatur for failure to disclose may also mitigate the 
repeat-player problem, as disclosure will reveal conflicts, whereas nondisclosure may lead 
to vacatur of pro-business decisions, ultimately rendering repeat-player advantages null. 
Businesses would likely push back against the California-inspired provisions more so than 
a preclusion of pre-dispute NDAs, however, given that the latter provision would still grant 
businesses the option of maintain some form of confidentiality. Moreover, California’s 
Consumer Data Publication Laws have failed to successfully generate significant 
arbitration data, as arbitration providers have not published arbitration data in a consistent 
format, ultimately making data allocation difficult, and obfuscating its overall usefulness 
in comparing providers.139 In turn, a statute requiring providers to issue reports would be 
more effective in informing consumers if standardized disclosures could be enforced, but 
a statute preempting pre-dispute NDAs would be more likely to garner bipartisan support, 
and in practice may overall be just as proficient in allocating data as a statutory 
requirement. 
Disclosure and publication requirements will also alleviate concerns over discovery 
limitations and the judicial review of arbitral decisions. Under Section 10 of the FAA, 
courts may vacate arbitral awards only where a party demonstrates that significant 
procedural deficiencies tainted the proceeding,140 and courts grant broad deference to an 
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arbitrator’s judgement on the merits of the claim.141 The presumptive enforceability of 
arbitral awards ensures that claims will not become tied up in a series of appeals. 
Undercutting the enforceability of arbitral awards would only undermine a fundamental 
goal of arbitration.142  
Because extensive judicial review may jeopardize the finality of arbitral awards, 
business groups would likely oppose any measure that expands judicial review. Therefore, 
information on arbitrator decisions is crucial to aid consumers in appealing procedurally-
deficient awards. Disclosing awards will assist parties seeking vacatur, as allegations of 
partiality may be easier to substantiate with a record of an arbitrator’s former cases and 
decisions. Furthermore, the enactment of statutory transcription requirements may provide 
evidence for consumers on appeal. Currently, however, no standard requirement that 
mandates the transcription of arbitration proceedings exists,143 and procedural rules that do 
offer transcription often require the parties to pay for the service.144 Rules requiring 
transcription or recording of arbitral proceedings may improve consumer claimant’s 
chances of obtaining vacatur of awards, as an available record would aid parties that allege 
procedural missteps, and although a written transcript may prohibitively increase 
arbitration costs, a mandated audio or video recording of proceedings may serve as a cost-
effective alternative. Similarly, transcripts and records of an arbitrator’s decision on 
motions for discovery can assist in the appeal of restrictive discovery limitations, which 
may incentivize arbitrators to provide sufficiently broad discovery based on the merits of 
a case. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The Arbitration Fairness Act seeks to implement much needed reform in the field of 
consumer arbitration, but does so in a manner that would ultimately end the practice of 
consumer arbitration.145 Research evidence proves the merits of settling consumer disputes 
through arbitration for consumers in terms of cost and efficiency, and warrant taking a 
second look at the AFA’s legislative scheme.146 Through practical legislative solutions, 
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such as requiring consumer-friendly clauses and broader transparency measures, the AFA 
can better address fairness concerns in the field without precluding the use of the cost-
effective dispute resolution practice that is arbitration.147 Implementing such reforms 
would better tailor arbitration to the consumer’s needs, would help legislators facilitate 
passage of the AFA, and would serve to benefit both consumers and corporations alike.148 
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